Onboarding and paywalls

The conversion half of Youper’s revenue gap

Mental health, Youper · UX Designer · Oct 2022 – Sep 2023

In short

Youper made about $1.95 per download, well below what it cost to serve each user, and half the people who reached the account screen left before finishing it. Over twelve months and thirteen releases, we rebuilt onboarding and the paywalls, testing one belief per release. Revenue per download rose to about $4.70, a 141% increase, against a target of more than 300%.

My role

The CEO and CPO set priorities and made the biggest calls. I shaped how those decisions got built, brought outside evidence, and argued for the parts I thought were wrong.

  • Ran benchmarks of mental health apps and AI products, and proposed options for each release
  • Argued for targeting the discount at 18–25-year-olds, using our cancellation data
  • Designed, handed off and QA’d thirteen releases, set up the tracking, and read the funnels weekly

Overview

Youper was a six-person company with an app for anxiety and depression, built on CBT techniques, on iOS and Android.

Drop-off happened at account creation, before anyone had seen what they were signing up for. Support tickets suggested that the ones who did get through didn’t understand the value of the daily check-in, or how to use the app.

Onboarding barely existed. Someone downloaded the app, completed a check-in, created an account, started a free trial and was let into everything else. Nothing along the way said what the app was for.

Over the next year we rebuilt it across thirteen releases. Partway through, we also rebuilt the app around open conversation with an AI, so the product we were selling changed while we worked on how to sell it.

This is one half of a bigger project to raise revenue per download. Ratings and feedback covers the other half: paying less to get each download. This case follows what we believed could close the gap, in the order we tested it.

Onboarding when I joined: a check-in, then an account, then the paywall. Nothing explained the app before asking for anything.

How we tested

Youper didn’t have the traffic for A/B tests. The CPO shipped one version a month and read the numbers after each. The reasoning: a month of directional signal was worth more than two months waiting for a clean result.

That trade runs through everything below. Changes arrived bundled, and comparisons run across time, not side by side. So this is the shape of what happened, not a controlled result.

Hypothesis one: People won’t commit to something nobody has explained

What we shipped

My benchmark of competing mental health apps found two patterns. Some dropped people straight into the product, which is what Youper already did. Others spent real screen time explaining the method and the features before asking for anything. We’d only ever built the first, so the team decided the second was worth testing.

In 11.05, we moved explanatory material ahead of the paywall: press mentions, a study published with Stanford, testimonials, a few mental health questions to make it more interactive than reading, and a product tour of the app’s features.

11.05 explained the app before asking for anything.
Then a product tour of the app's features. Sign-up and the first paywall came after these screens.

What happened

Over the next month, drop-off before account creation fell, and slightly more of the people who reached the paywall started a free trial. But a new drop-off appeared earlier, in the middle of the anxiety screening, before anyone reached the product tour. The explanation helped, and we’d also added enough screens for people to quit before the end of them.

Hypothesis two: The free trial gives away what people would pay for

What we shipped

In 12.00 the product changed underneath us. Canned responses became a real conversation with a large language model, and every reply now had a cost. Conversion held steady on that release.

We capped the free tier at one message and gave subscribers ten. That held the cost down for free users, but the seven-day trial still gave everyone unlimited access to the most expensive part of the product.

After I shared a second benchmark, this time of AI products, the CEO proposed removing the trial. In 12.01, users had to pay up front to keep using the app.

Without a trial, users could start a conversation but were stopped right after the first reply.

What happened

The numbers fell, and we brought the trial back in a patch about a week later. Nothing else shipped in between, so the trial was the cause.

Hypothesis three: Price is what stops people at the paywall

What we shipped

The team had decided to offer a discount, and I argued for who should get it. Our dashboards showed that 18–25-year-olds were the largest group canceling after the trial, and the most likely to give cost as the reason. I proposed targeting them, and it shipped in 12.02 as a gift for decliners in that age group.

The discount appeared right after someone declined the first paywall.
In 12.02, the flow checked the user's age first.

What happened

The discount didn’t earn the rules it added. 12.03 dropped the age targeting and offered it to everyone. The discount stayed; my targeting didn’t.

Hypothesis four: People will pay before they sign up

What we shipped

12.05 put a new paywall before sign-up and moved the account to the end, with the CBT material from hypothesis one ahead of both. People who declined saw screens tailored to the three goals they had picked, then a second paywall after signing up. If they declined again, a third paywall offered 40% off for five minutes. Free users kept the app, with one message to the AI.

Three paywalls: before sign-up, right after it, and a five-minute discount for anyone who declined twice.

What happened

The first paywall converted better before account creation than it had after it, and revenue per download rose across the series. The same release dropped the product tour, so two things changed at once. They weren’t independent, either: the tour ran after account creation, and moving the account to the end left it nowhere to go.

Impact

Revenue per download went from about $1.95 to about $4.70, a 141% increase. The target was more than 300%, and we didn’t reach it.

Two caveats. The period covers the move to an AI product, so part of the rise is the product getting better, not the selling. And internal figures are under NDA: revenue comes from public third-party estimates, and the target and drop-off figures from my own notes.

The flow that went live in September 2023, in five key screens: CBT content, how to use the app, a paywall before sign-up, then the first conversation.
The full flow, about 40 screens. A second paywall and a discount followed for anyone who declined. The five key screens are outlined in orange.

Reflections

Good research can still point to the wrong fix. I had room to test my own idea, and room to be wrong about it. The research was real: 18–25-year-olds were canceling after the trial and naming cost as the reason. What I read into it was that they needed a different price. The targeting didn’t move the numbers enough to pay for its rules. I’d still test it; I’d just hold the idea more loosely.

Ask why, not only how. The team was open to ideas from anyone in the room. Looking back, I could have used that more to question why we were testing what we were testing, not just how to build it.